In Evans, both the U.K. High Court and Court of Appeal upheld Howard Johnston's right to refuse Natallie Evans access to the stored embryos which represented her only hope of having a child which was genetically her own. In this note, I focus on claims of gender (in)equality in the resolution of Evans. My argument is that such claims are often made all too easily, without full consideration of the problems of advancing them in the context of procreative decision-making, where men and women are inevitably differently situated. I conclude that although equality arguments are not wholly without value in this context, they need be used with extreme care. And, with due caution, I set out an equality argument of my own which was not made in Evans.
INTRODUCTION
In October 2001, Natallie Evans was told that due to the presence of serious tumours both of her ovaries would have to be removed. In order to preserve some possibility of having the child she had always wanted, she agreed for some eggs to be harvested from her, and for embryos created from them and the sperm of her partner, Howard Johnston, to be stored for future use. Following the removal of her ovaries, whilst still able to carry a pregnancy normally, Ms. Evans was left unable to conceive spontaneously. Consequently, use of the frozen embryos After briefly reviewing the legal issues raised by the case, I want to offer some more general thoughts about gender equality in reproductive decision-making and the way such arguments are deployed in Evans.
THE LEGAL ISSUES
The Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 1990 (the 1990 Act) provides that embryos which have been created in vitro can only be used within the terms of "an effective consent" from each of the parties whose gametes were used to create it. 3 It further provides that such consent can be varied or revoked at any time up until the moment that the embryos are used. 4 Mr. Johnston's right to withdraw his consent therefore seemed very clear.
Ms. Evans based her case on four arguments both in the High Court and, having failed there, in an unsuccessful appeal against that Court's ruling. First, she claimed that Mr. Johnston could not now withdraw his consent to treatment. Given that effective consent existed at the date of harvest and storage, she argued, it must be assumed to continue, as to hold otherwise would place the treating clinic under an intolerable burden to investigate the current state of a couple's 3 Schedule 3, para. 6(3): "An embryo the creation of which was brought about in vitro must not be used for any purpose unless there is an effective consent by each person whose gametes were used to bring about the creation of the embryo to the use for that purpose and the embryo is used in accordance with those consents." 4 See Schedule 3, para 4: (1) "The terms of any consent under this Schedule may from time to time be varied, and the consent may be withdrawn, by notice given by the person who gave the consent to the person keeping the gametes or embryo to which the consent is relevant. (2) The terms of any consent to the use of an embryo cannot be varied, and such consent cannot be withdrawn, once the embryo has been used -(a) in providing treatment services, or (b) for the purposes of research." relationship. Both courts rejected this argument, finding that if those who formerly sought treatment "as a joint enterprise" no longer do so, the original consent must be deemed inoperative as the treatment services would no longer be within the terms described in the consent.
5 As a question of fact, Mr. Johnston and Ms.
Evans would plainly not be united in their quest for treatment services and, Ms. Evans' second contention was that the process of selecting and storing of embryos meant that they had already been "used" in the provision of treatment services with the result that, under the terms of the 1990 Act, consent could no longer be varied or withdrawn. Both courts also rejected this claim. The Court of Appeal noted that it would be "almost absurd" to adopt a construction the effects of which would be to remove a person's right to withdraw consent on the very day that the embryos were created. Seen from that perspective, there is discrimination between the position of Ms.
Evans and that of a woman who conceives through normal sexual intercourse.
The genetic father is allowed to withdraw his consent in I.V.F. later than he could do so in ordinary sexual intercourse. In this brief commentary, I do not intend further to explore the courts' response to the legal issues raised by Evans. For Thorpe and Sedley L.J.J., this verdict was wholly "dependent on the resolution of the law" rather than requiring the "experienced discretion that seeks to achieve fairness" which is usually required of the family law judge. 16 The wording of the 1990 Act certainly pointed strongly towards the conclusion they reached, although reading between the lines of the assertions of both gender equality and gender inequality in Evans, before going on to suggest that there is one specific aspect of the case which may usefully be read in terms of gender inequality. 16 Ibid., at para. 1. 17 I differ here from the view expressed by a previous commentator for Feminist Legal Studies (Miola 2004, p. 76) who considers that the court "clearly came to the wrong conclusion" in Evans. In my view, the two courts come to the conclusion very strongly indicated by the 1990 Act. However, see below and Sheldon (forthcoming) for two tentative suggestions for further arguments which might have been advanced on behalf of Ms Evans. Note further the judges' exploration of a third (which had not been raised by counsel): whether Mr Johnston would feel able to agree to the continued storage of the embryos, in the hope that Ms Evans would eventually remarry or seek treatment with another man who might become the father of any resulting children by virtue of the operation of s. 28 of the 1990 Act. 18 Mary Warnock, the philosopher responsible for developing its conceptual underpinning, has described the 1990 Act as "ambiguous" in the light of Evans, and confessed that the Committee she chaired "did not pursue a case … where there is disagreement between the parties", http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/england/2213640. Johnston had no business to change his mind at this stage:
Has no one considered the relative pain these people have endured? For a man, I.V.F.
involves nothing more humiliating than having five minutes of fun with a dirty magazine. For women there's a long course of invasive hormone treatment, an agonising surgical procedure to remove the eggs and in some cases, the risk of long-term illness or even death if the treatment goes wrong. We've accepted in the case of abortion that a foetus, once conceived, is the woman's responsibility. It is her body that will carry it to term. It is her body that will be invaded if she chooses to terminate. In terms of the physical investment involved, I can see no difference, whether the creative process takes place in the womb or in the test tube … Conception is a joint enterprise, whether both agree a child should result or not, and carries enduring responsibility. The Child Support Agency sees to that. Why should a technical method of conception be any different (ibid).
Kent Academic Repository -http://kar.kent.ac.uk Published version available in 'Feminist Legal Studies, 12 (3). pp. 303-316' -12 -What seems to unite these commentators is a belief that the location of the embryos (inside or outside a woman's body) is not relevant to the woman's greater interests in, and rights over, them. 23 Grayling is explicit on this point:
the male contributor to the creation of frozen embryos is anyway in exactly the same moral situation as any man who makes a woman pregnant but later separates from her. An embryo represents the beginning of a pregnancy; no moral difference is made by the merely geographical matter of whether it is in a womb or a refrigerator. If a woman has the right to choose to bring that embryo to term when it is in her womb, she surely has the same right if it is currently in a fridge (2003) .
Is the "merely geographical" fact that the disputed embryos currently exist outside of the body of Ms. Evans a difference which legitimates treating her differently from a pregnant woman, according greater legal rights to Mr. Johnston than those enjoyed by the partners of pregnant women (who surely cannot insist on the destruction of the embryo in utero)? This issue might perhaps be clarified by asking a slightly different question: why is it that the partners of pregnant women have no right to a say in the outcome of their pregnancies? 24 The most compelling argument must surely be not that women have some special interest in bearing a (genetic) child that men do not share, but rather that the pregnant woman must have control over the pregnancy because the embryo is developing within her body and anything done to affect it must, of necessity, be mediated through her. Evans by the proposed destruction of the embryos is apparent, the reality of this situation is surely very far from forced termination.
26
What Grayling, Murray and
Blood ignore is the fact that the process of creating a child has two distinct biological components for women (only one of which is shared by men): a genetic and a gestational link. It is this unique gestational connection which justifies women's typically greater control over reproduction and in Evans this is lacking.
What is interesting here is that, notwithstanding their denial of the importance of gestation, the commentators cited seem to assume a gender inequality in Kent Academic Repository -http://kar.kent.ac.uk Published version available in 'Feminist Legal Studies, 12 (3). pp. 303-316' -14 -be overstated. This difference alone seems to me to be an unsatisfactory basis for granting control over such an important event in the lives of two individuals to just one of them.
Is it rather then the factors cited by Grayling which should ground women's greater control over procreation? Does women's more central role in reproduction, the "experience of pregnancy, childbirth, the early nurture of an infant and the bonds that persist for a lifetime thereafter" (Grayling 2003) ground special rights to control procreative decisions? Grayling is surely correct in noting the existence of a range of sexed/gendered differences, not just in gestation but also in the typical arrangements of care for young children, and such differences should surely be relevant in allowing women control of decisions made during pregnancy. But should they extend to assuming greater rights to women over embryos which exist ex utero? Such a view cannot rest on the fact that women have a greater involvement with specific pregnancies and children (which, presumably, would ground greater rights only with regard to the particular pregnancies and children in question). Such a view must rather rest on the belief that women generally and inherently have a greater interest in procreation than do men. And that will strike many as deeply problematic.
CORRECTING BIOLOGICAL INEQUALITY: AN ARGUMENT UNEXPLORED IN EVANS
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The above analysis suggests that it is easy to fall foul of the mistake of making easy assumptions regarding both gender equality and gender inequality in the regulation of reproductive decision-making. As such, the lesson to be drawn from this discussion of Evans may simply be one of greater caution. But, with due trepidation, it does seem to me that there was one possible claim of gender inequality which was left unexplored in Evans. One final point bears making by way of conclusion. Whatever else divided Ms.
Evans and Mr. Johnston, they were united in a belief in the importance of genetic links in grounding parenthood. Ms. Evans' medical condition does not deny her the possibility of carrying a pregnancy and giving birth to a child; what is now excluded is the possibility of that child being genetically her own. Likewise, Mr
Johnston made it clear that he did not want to have a genetic child in the world unless he could be involved in actively parenting it. He claimed here to be guided not just by the legal and financial burdens of fatherhood, but also by the psychological and moral ones. 32 Thus, those who would criticise Mr. Johnston for his unwillingness to allow Ms. Evans to go ahead, given the only cost to him was to have an unwanted child, need to explain why his reasons for not wanting a genetic child are less compelling than Ms Evans's desire for wanting a genetically related child rather than one conceived via donor embryo. This raises two further 31 It also suggests a clear tension in the role of clinics in similar factual situations who may find themselves, at the same time, advising on the most medically advantageous storage of gametes for a cancer sufferer like Natallie Evans, whilst simultaneously operating at gate-keepers for access to I.V.F. On this point, see further Sheldon (forthcoming). 32 Mr Johnston told the Court of Appeal that his "clear position was one of fundamental rather than purely financial objection", Evans (C.A.), supra n. 1, at para. 32. 
